Widespread internet shutdown on Esfand 9, 1404 (before US and Israel military attacks on Islamic republic)

On the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, corresponding to 9 Esfand 1404 in the Iranian calendar, one of the largest internet shutdowns in the country’s history occurred. The disruption began at the same time as the joint military strikes launched by the United States and Israel against Iran. The shutdown did not start days before the attack, as some early rumors suggested. Instead, it began that same morning as an immediate reaction by the government. Within hours, Iran’s access to the global internet was almost completely cut off, leaving only limited internal connectivity. Before that day, internet access in Iran had not been fully blocked. Following nationwide protests that began on January 8, 2026, the government had already imposed a near-total internet shutdown for several weeks. That earlier disruption lasted close to three weeks and was only partially lifted toward the end of February. In the days leading up to February 28, internet access had largely returned, although it remained heavily censored and monitored. No nationwide shutdown had been reported immediately before the attacks. The situation changed rapidly on the morning of the strikes. Between roughly 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. Tehran time, the first waves of air and cyber attacks by the United States and Israel began. Shortly afterward, Iranian authorities ordered a nationwide shutdown of international internet connectivity. Within one to two hours, Iran’s connection to the global internet dropped dramatically. Internet monitoring organizations reported that national connectivity fell to about four percent of normal levels and later stabilized at roughly one percent. Technical data indicated that internet traffic across major provinces dropped by as much as 98 percent. The disruption affected both mobile networks and fixed broadband connections, and even some satellite services experienced interference. During this period, only a limited portion of the country’s domestic network infrastructure remained available. A small number of government-approved websites and internal communication platforms continued to operate under strict limitations. State media and official institutions used these internal networks to broadcast government statements and messages. Reports indicated that the shutdown orders were issued directly to telecommunications companies and internet service providers across the country. While some analysts suggested that a portion of the disruption might also have been caused by cyber operations or physical damage to infrastructure such as fiber-optic cables, most monitoring organizations concluded that the primary cause was a deliberate decision by the Iranian government to restrict external connectivity. In the days that followed, the shutdown continued. By mid-March 2026, more than two weeks after the initial disruption, internet access for the general public remained extremely limited. Some reports suggested that the country experienced over 17 consecutive days of near-total disconnection, with public connectivity still hovering around one percent of normal levels. During this time, selective access to the internet was reportedly granted to certain state institutions and government-aligned media outlets in order to broadcast official narratives. International phone connections were either blocked or restricted in many regions, and attempts by citizens to access satellite internet services also faced disruptions. Analysts believe the shutdown was part of the government’s broader strategy to control the wartime information environment. The main objective was to prevent the spread of images and videos showing the attacks, casualties, and damage in different cities. Restricting internet access also made it more difficult for protests or large gatherings to be organized and allowed authorities to manage the domestic media narrative more tightly. Some experts also suggested that disconnecting from the global network could serve as a defensive measure against external cyber operations. Similar strategies had been used previously during nationwide protests and earlier regional conflicts. International human rights organizations strongly criticized the shutdown. They argued that cutting internet access during a crisis can put civilians at greater risk because it disrupts communication with families, limits access to reliable information, and complicates coordination for medical and emergency services. The social impact of the shutdown was significant. Millions of people inside and outside Iran were unable to contact their relatives for extended periods. Many online services and digital businesses were severely disrupted. In some cases, even banking systems and electronic payment networks experienced difficulties. The shutdown also created a large information vacuum. Without access to independent media and social networks, rumors spread quickly while government narratives dominated the domestic information space. Psychologically, many Iranians described the situation as a form of isolation from the outside world. While military strikes were occurring in parts of the country, communication with the rest of the world was almost entirely cut off. Global internet monitoring groups tracked the disruption in real time, and several international organizations called on the Iranian government to restore connectivity. However, during the first weeks following the outbreak of the conflict, the restrictions largely remained in place and nationwide internet access did not return to normal. According to Islamic Republic sources, this observance is registered and presented in the official calendar in this form and with these descriptions.